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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No. 
: 14582 
-vs-
LAWRENCE H. ALLMENDINGER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appe]. 1.ant v/as charged with unlawful distribution 
of a controlled substance, a felony* 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
As a result of plea-bargaining, appellant plead 
guilty to the lesser offense of possession of a controlled 
substance, a misdemeanor. The Court offered appellant a 
year on probation instead of six months in jail, which 
appellant accepted. Nine months later, appellant was 
ordered to show cause as to why probation should not 
be revoked. Appellant moved to dismiss the Order to 
Show Cause on the grounds that the court lost jurisdiction 
over appellant after six months, which is the maximum 
sentence for possession. The Court den Led the Motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the 
decision of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(See Disposition in the Lower Court) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN STATUTORILY 
PRESCRIBED DISCRETION IN PLACING APPELLANT ON PROBATION FOR 
A YEAR. 
Appellant contends that there is no statutory author-
ity for extending probicion beyond the maximum limits pre-
scribed by the legislature for imprisonment for an offense. 
Respondent replies that the Utah Code specifically provides 
for extentions of probation beyond maximum imprisonment 
limits. Furthermore, the Utah statute is very similar to 
most other state and federal statutes in this respect. 
The Utah law also parallels standards suggested by the 
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American Bar Association and the Model Penal Code. 
Finally, respondent submits that several very important 
policy considerations are satisfied by the Utah statute* 
Therefore, respondent asks this Court to affirm the 
decision of the district court. 
Contrary to appellant1s assertion that there 
is no authority for extending a probation period beyond 
a maximum prison sentence, the Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 77-35-17 (1953) reads: 
"Upon a plea of guilty or con-
viction of any crime or offense, if 
it appears compatible with the 
public interest, the court having 
jurisdiction may suspend the imposition 
or the execution of sentence and may 
place the defendant on probation for 
such period of time as the court shall 
determine. 
The court may subsequently increase 
01 decrease the probation period, and 
iu<iy revoke or modify any condition 
ol probation." (Emphasis added) 
Another section of the Utah Code, § 58-37-8(10), which 
deals with penalties for possessing marijuanar among other 
things, provides that the court may place a defendant on 
probation upon "any reasonable terms and conditions as may 
be required." Obviously, the legislature intended to give 
the courts a great deal of discretion in granting probation. 
Through these provisions the legislature provides all-
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important flexibility in the administration of this 
humane perogative. The court may set the duration of 
probation and also modify any conditions thereof. This 
is consistant with the overall policy of the Utah 
Criminal Code as expressed in Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-1-104 (as amended 1975): 
"The provisions of this code 
shall be construed in accordance 
with these general principles: . . . 
(3) prescribe penalties. . . which 
permit recognition of difference in 
rehabilitation possibilities among 
individual offenders,11 (Emphasis 
added) 
As will be demonstrated, infra p. 7 / there are many 
important reasons for a court to have broad discretion 
when dealing with so many different people. Numerous 
other states recognize this need, as their code pro-
visions demons!rate. 
Com I > in Colorado, like Utah, may grant 
probation for whatever period as they deem best (C.R.S. 
§ 16-11-202). Other states allow the trial court to set 
probation within some outside limit that has nothing to 
do with the possible incarceration limits. In Nevada, 
for example, probation may be extended for as long as 
five years (NRS 176.215). Hawaii, like Nevada places 
no less than a five year limit on probation, even for 
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misdemeanors (HRS, § 711-77). Oklahoma permits probation 
to extend up to two years (OSA 22 § 991c)j. 
Some states have different probation period 
limitations depending on whether the defendant was con-
victed of a felony or a misdemeanor. Kansas specifies 
five years for felonies and two years for misdemeanors. 
Furthermore, felony probation may be later extended five 
additional years and misdemeanor probation two. The 
statute, however, goes on to provide that, in any case, 
felony probation can not be extended past the sentence 
limit (KSA 21-4 611). Obviously the same is not true for 
misdemeanors. In Kansas a misdemeanant may receive only 
a year's incarceration (KSA 21-4502). Therefore, in 
Kansas, a misdemeanant may be placed on probation for up 
to four times (two years original and two years extension) 
as long as the maximum sentence limit. 
The Idaho statute is similar to that in 
Kansas. A misdemeanant may be placed on 
up to two years (IC 19-2601(7)) although the maximum 
sentence is six months imprisonment (IC 18-113). California 
goes even further. In that state a misdemeanant who could 
only be incarcerated for 90 days may be placed on proba-
tion for as long as three years (California Penal Code, 
§ 1203a) and People v. Heath, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968)). 
probation for 
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Oregon has an interesting statute. In that 
state, a defendant may not be placed on probation for 
less than a year (ORS 137.010). Obviously the Oregon 
legislature feels that probation for less than a year 
is ineffective. 
Of all the western states only Arizona, New 
Mexico and Washington restrict probation by the maximum 
length of sentence (ARS 13-1657, NMSA 40A-29-19 and 
RCW 9.95.200). 
Federal statutes (18 USC § 3 651) provide for an 
extended probation period and have been supported by 
the United States Supreme Court in a line of cases, 
primary of which is Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 
147, 23 L.Ed.2d 162, 89 S.Ct. 1503 (1969). In Frank, 
Mr. Justice Marshall said, for the Court: 
"Numerous federal and state 
statutory schemes allow significant 
periods to be imposed for otherwise 
petty offenses. For example, under 
federal Jaw, most offenders may be 
placed on probation for up to five 
years in lieu of or, in certain 
cases, j.n addition to a term of 
imprisonment. 
* * * 
Therefore, the maximum penalty 
authorized in petty offense cases 
Includes Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California, 
Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, 
New Mexico, Kansas and Oklahoma. 
-6-
is not simply six months imprison-
ment and a $500.00 fine. A petty 
offender may be placed on probation 
for up to five years and if the 
terms of probation are violated, he 
may then be imprisoned for six 
months.n 
Finally the American Bar Association has set 
forth similar guidelines in its Standards for Criminal 
Justice. The American Bar Association suggests two 
years probation for a misdemeanor and up to five for a 
felony (Standards, p. 21 Probation). The committee adds 
the opinion that the limits on the length of a sentence 
to probation should be determined independently of the 
appropriate length of a prison sentence for the same 
offense (Standards, p. 26). 
There are many good policy reasons for allowing 
a trial judge the discretion to extend probation for a 
reasonable length of time even if it may be for longer than 
the maximum possible sentence. In his Memorandum Decision 
Judge Croft of the lower court listed two strong reasons 
in support of probation extension. First under Utah law 
some jail sentences cannot exceed 90 days, as for a Class 
C misdemeanor (Section 76-3-204(3)). A probationary 
period of such limited duration hardly serves any useful 
purpose. As Judge Croft pointed out: 
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"It is misdemeanor type offenses 
where probation is usually indicated 
rather than a jail sentence, but if 
the supervision of such a wrongdoer is 
to be limited to the maximum jail 
sentence that can be served, proba-
tion in such cases becomes only a 
gesture. . . ." (R-76) 
Judge Croft goes on to say: 
" . . . the court, when given the 
alternative of a short jail sentence 
or a short and thus useless probation 
period, may well start imposing jail 
sentences in those cases where proper 
probation supervision, if available, 
may well steer a defendant away from 
further criminal activity." (Id.) 
Judge Croft points out a second good reason for an 
extended probation period: 
"The second reason why I do not 
believe the law should or does re-
quire the limitation of a probation 
period as contended by defendant 
is that, as in the case at bar, 
defendants in most cases, through 
plea negotiations, end up pleading 
to a lesser included offense, 
frequently doing so in the belief 
that a plea to the lesser offense 
may more likely result in consideration 
for probation. If courts are to be 
limited to a brief probation period, 
courts are then placed in the position 
of either denying the plea to a lesser 
included offense, or using jail 
sentences as the only reasonable sen-
tence remaining open to the court. . . . " 
(R-76) 
Probation is an attempt to give first offenders 
and some others a chance to demonstrate their capacity to 
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overcome their errors. Another reason for an extension 
of this program may be demonstrated by a hypothetical.case. 
The accused is convicted and sentenced to probation and 
payment of a fine as provided by Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-35-17 (1953, as amended). Suppose the crime was 
a misdemeanor with a penalty of six months in jail. 
Further suppose the convicted man was unable to pay the 
fine within the six months. Under the law, as appellant 
would have it, the man would have to be thrown in jail. 
The more humane view would be to allow the trial judge 
the discretion to extend probation beyond the six months 
and give the man some additional time to make good his 
debt. 
Respondent strongly urges this court to affirm 
the decision of the lower court. Appellant would seek 
to apply very riqid standards in an area that has a 
special need for discretion. A judge, viewing the defendant 
face to face, hearing discussion from both sides concerning 
the defendant, and receiving reports from adult probation 
and parole is in a much better position to evaluate the 
needs of an individual than is the legislature. The 
legislature realized all this and thus specifically and 
unequivically endowed the trial court v/ith broad discretion 
which respondent asks this court to sustain. 
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Appellant alleges that there is ample authority 
for his position that probation should be limited by 
statutory sentencing provisions. Respondent answers that 
most of appellant's proffered authority is misapplied 
and inapplicable to the instant question. The remainder 
simply demonstrates the minority view. 
Appellant said the general rule is stated in 
21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law, § 555 (p.4 of Appellant's 
brief). 
"Where the suspension of imposition 
of sentence is authorized, the court 
. . . may, after such suspension, pro-
nounce sentence at any time provided 
the maximum period for which sentence 
could have been imposed or probation 
granted has not elapsed." 
A close readincj of the rule, however, and of the case 
cited as supper Ling the rule demonstrate that " . . . 
maximum period Cor which sentence could have been imposed 
. . ." means the statutory period after conviction in 
which the court must pronounce sentence. It has absolutely 
nothing to do with the sentence actually imposed or 
maximum possible sentences. In other words, the rule 
simply states that a court can't wait forever to impose 
some kind of sentence, whether it is imprisonment or 
probation. The rule has nothing to do with how long 
probation may continue if it is imposed. 
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On page six of his brief appellant cites 
In re Carroll/ a Kansas case, as authority for his 
position• Respondent has already shown that Kansas law 
allows probation to continue for up to four times the 
maximum incarceration period in the case of a misdemeanor. 
If Carroll were still good law there would be a con-
tradiction. Carroll, however, is a 1914 case and has 
long since been overturned by legislative action. In 
Application of Young, 201 Kan. 140, 439 P.?d 142 (1968), 
the Supreme Court of Kansas explains: 
"The parole authority of a police 
court was considered in Carroll. 
The statute then in effect (Laws 
of 1909, Chap. 116, Sec. 2) was 
examined and since it provided no 
limit on the term of a parole granted 
thereunder, this court held that a 
police court had no power to grant a 
parole for a term longer than the 
sentence imposed. . . . The statute 
was amended in 1947. . . under 
which a police court is specifically 
authorized to grant a parole for a 
term extending beyond the sentence. . . 
* * * 
The language of K.S.A. 20-2312 
is plain and unambiguous. . . . The 
statute supercedes any case law 
pertaining to the subject. (43P P.2d 
at 143, 145) 
Appellant relies heavily on Idaho cases in 
his argument, particular State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 
853, 452 P.2d 350 (1969), and Ex Parte Medley, 73 Idaho 
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474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953). Respondent contends that 
neither case applies here. In Idaho, although probation 
can be four times longer than imprisonment for a mis-
demeanor, the rule is different for felonies where pro-
bation is limited by the maximum period of incarceration. 
Both the Sandoval and Medley decisions involve felony 
convictions and not a misdemeanor conviction as in the 
instant case. Obviously therefore, neither case is 
authority for appellant's position. 
Appellant further cites the Oklahoma case of 
Ex Parte Eaton, 29 Okla. Crim. 275, 233 P.781 (1925). 
Suffice it to say that the pertinant Oklahoma statute 
has been revised. Subsequent to 1970 the law in Oklahoma 
is that a probation period may be for as long as two 
years (OSA 22 § 991c (1970)). 
People v. Blakeman, 170 Ca.2d 596, 339 P.2d 
202 (1959), a California case, is also unavailable to 
appellant as authority. That case simply states that if 
no probation period is specified by the* judge, the maximum 
prison term becomes the period of probcition. It does not 
stand for the proposition, as implied by appellant, that 
probation could not be longer- In fact, the California 
courts have upheld a three year probation period in a 
case where the maximum sentence was 90 days. (People v. 
Heath, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457, 266 C.A.2d 754 (1968)). 
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The only other authority cited by appellant is 
State v. Lard, 86 N.M. 71, 519 P.2d 307 (1974). Respondent 
admits that in New Mexico a convicted person may not be 
placed on probation for a longer period than he may be 
imprisoned. However, respondent points out that New 
Mexico along with Arizona and Washington are the only 
three (out of fourteen) western states that so hold. 
Respondent submits that Utah should maintain its position 
among those states that espouse the majority view. 
Appellant is correct, in his report of the 
case law on the subject, that when the trial court 
fails to specify the period of probation it is generally 
held to be the same as the maximum sentence period. This 
is not a case, however, of an unspecified probation period. 
The trial couri very specifically sentenced appellant to 
one yeai probul ion. Thereafter appellant very specifically 
accepted that sentence. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND THAT PRO-
BATION BE LIMITED BY SENTENCE PROVISIONS. 
In his second argument appellant goes to great 
and imaginative lengths in attempting to prove that the 
Utah legislature, although not specifically so stating, 
meant for probation periods to be limited by the incarcer-
ation provisions of the Code. Respondent submits that a 
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simple reading of the statute is more than sufficient 
to convey the legislative intent. As shown, supra, 
the Utah legislature very clearly, and with great 
supporting intent, meant for trial judges to have 
wide discretion in probation matters. In interpreting 
statutes the court should assume that each word of a 
statute v/as used advisedly and should be given applica-
tion in accord with their usually accepted meaning 
(Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 
P.2d 1035 (1971). Respondent submits that the following 
words are very clear: 
"Upon a plea of guilty or con-
viction. . . the Court having juris-
diction. . . may place the defendant 
on probation for such period of time 
as the court shall determine." (Utah 
Code Annotated § 77-35-17~Tr953)) 
(Umphasis added) 
App* Jlant further argues that probation is a 
penalty and not d privilege. This is exactly backwards 
of the truth. When a man commits a crime and is adjudged 
to be guilty he can be sentenced to serve a time in 
jail or prison. That would be the penalty for his actions. 
Thereafter, as a privilege, granted for whatever humane 
reasons, the court may allow that man to be placed on 
probation in lieu of incarceration. Furthermore, respondent 
asks this court to take judicial notice that any reasonable 
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man would prefer as much as three years probation to 
one year in prison confinement. Obviously appellant 
feels this way since he choose, voluntarily and of his 
own accord, one yearfs probation rather than six months 
in jail. 
Finally, appellant argues that a defendant 
has certain rights while on probation. Respondent 
stipulates as much. However, all of the "forward looking 
due process concepts" under Morrisey v. Brewer and all 
other cases cited by appellant, have absolutely nothing 
to do with the length of probation. This is not a case 
where the issue is a revocation hearing, notice, speedy 
trial, written findings, or any of the other Morrisey 
requirements. The Utah legislature may make the law on 
length of probation and they have wisely chosen to grant 
the judge the discretion to solve that problem. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there is specific statutory authority 
supporting the decision of the lower court, and since 
Utah's statutes are very similar to those of most other 
states, respondent urges this court to affirm the decision 
of the lower court. Such affirmation would carry out the 
intent of the legislature of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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